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IN RE CARY: A JUDICIAL RECOGNITION
OF ILLICIT COHABITATION
The 1970 census figures indicate that today perhaps eight times
as many couples are living together without being married as cohabited
ten years ago. 1 While these figures are estimates, they represent a
marked American trend toward cohabitation outside wedlock; California is certainly no exception to the trend. In apparent recognition
of the increasing popularity of illicit cohabitation, the first district of
the California Court of Appeals, in In re Cary,2 extended its assistance
to an unmarried couple who were having difficulties terminating their
relationship. The court applied California's community property system to a meretricious 3 relationship for the first time in the state's history. It justified this extension of the community property system on
the dual grounds of a 1969 revision of California's divorce law4 and
the finding of a "family" relationship that came within the purview of
the Family Law Act.3 The ruling, however, abrogated 78 years of
California law6 and judicial precedent, 7 cited but defied the underlying
rationale of California's community property system," misunderstood
1. 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PERSONS BY
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, table 11, at 4B; 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1960 CEN;US
OF POPULATION, PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, table 15, at 4B.
2. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
3. A meretricious spouse is "[o]ne who cohabits with another, knowing that the
relationship does not constitute a valid marriage . . . . Either spouse, or both, may
be meretricious." Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 866, 873 (1962).

4.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).

5. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The court stated that "[t]he
Family Law Act obviously requires that there be established not only an ostensible
marital relationship but also an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations attending
marriage." Id. at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (emphasis added). However, there is
no provision in the Family Law Act that speaks of a "family." The word "family"
is in the title of the act but the act is concerned with legal marriages. Although the
court uses the words "obviously requires" it overlooked the actual provisions of the
Family Law Act: 1) a legal marriage, 2) a solemnization by a clergyman, or 3) a
"good faith" belief in the legality of the marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4100, 4213,
4452 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970). Section 4100 was originally enacted
in 1872 as section 55 and was amended in 1895 to eliminate the statutory authority
for common law marriages. Cal. Stat. 1895, ch. 129, § I at 121.
See text ac7. E.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
companying notes 85-87 infra.
8. "An early day, but nevertheless still valid, rationale of California's com-
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the intentions of the legislature, 9 and misapplied the Family Law Act
of 1969.10
The Cary decision has left a plethora of problems for the courts,
attorneys and meretricious couples. First, the court stated that
"much more than . . . an unmarried living arrangement between a
man and woman"' 1 must be found before the community property
system will be applicable. The court held that "an ostensible marital
relationship . . . an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and
mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations attending marriage ' 2 must exist. But, how does one determine when a couple slips from an "unmarried living arrangement" into
an "actual family relationship" that qualifies for the application of
community property laws? When is the ostensible marital relationship
entered into? If the courts are to look to the inception of the cohabitation, then the decision has the effect of allowing an "equitable
common law marriage";'" couples may now marry one another without
munity property law is found in Meyer v. Kinzer (1895) 12 Cal. 247, 251-252, where
the state's Supreme Court said- 'The [community property law] proceeds upon the theory that the marriage, in respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry
to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution, in case of surviving the other. To the community all acquisitions by either,
whether made jointly or separately, belong. . . . All property is common property,
except that owned previous to marriage or subsequently acquired in a particular way.
.'
34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The Cary court notes that
this principle is given present day expression by CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (West 1954)
and finally notes that the principle "ordinarily appl[ies] only to those legally wed
."
34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. As a means of circumventing
this ordinary application, the court then draws strength from the good faith putative
spouse exception. Id. at 349, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The putative spouse doctrine
can be distinguished, however, because of the "good faith" belief in the legality of the
marriage.
9. See text accompanying notes 37-48 infra.
10. CAL. Cxv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).
11. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
12. Id.
13. The effect of the Cary decision is to nullify the legislative decision to encourage solemnized marriages. Prior to 1895, California recognized consensual common law marriages as a valid form of legal marriage. In 1895, section 55 was
amended to eliminate common law marriages and require some form of solemnization
for a valid marriage. Cal. Stat. 1895, ch. 129, § 1 at 121. Consent alone will not
constitute marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970). With the enactment of
the Family Law Act, the legislature maintained this policy decision for section 4100
was a re-enactment of section 55 without change except for the reference to section
4213 instead of former section 79. The Cary decision, however, applied marital law
and community property principles to a couple whose relationship was based on consent
alone. Thus, the legislative decision to distinguish legal solemnized marriages from
consensual relationships is nullified by the Cary decision; the decision effectively revitalizes consensual common law marriage.

1228
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the legal prerequisites of the Civil Code. 4 If, on the other hand, the
existence of a "family relationship" can only be determined when the

couple separates, many couples will find themselves faced with judicial
interference and legal ramifications that they originally sought to avoid

by refusing to obtain a legal marriage.
A second series of problems concerns how much of California's
marital law is to apply to meretricious couples. The court in Cary
applied community property rights to divide the couple's property on
dissolution. Does this application also affect the couple's property liabilities to a creditor,' 5 or rights of management and control? 6 In
addition, what are the miscellaneous rights to wrongful death bene-

fits,'

8 social security benefits,'
workmen's compensation,
2
°

lowance," and homestead? '

9

family al-

14. "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the
consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone
will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as authorized by this code, except as provided by Section 4213." CAL. CIrV.
CODE § 4100 (West 1970).
15. See, e.g., id. §§ 4358, 5120, 5121 & 5124 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).
16. Id. §§ 5125, 5127 (West 1970), as amended, Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 987, §§ 1415 at 1682-83 (giving the woman an equal voice in the management and control of
the community personal property and community real property). The 1973 amendments are operative on January 1, 1975.
17. Under CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 377 (West 1970) a legal spouse, as an heir
of his or her deceased spouse, has a right to maintain a cause of action for wrongful
death. Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (1958), held that since
a putative spouse had an intestate right of succession, she could maintain an action
for the wrongful death of her spouse. The necessary bridge to allow the putative
spouse to maintain a wrongful death action was the intestate right accorded to the putative spouse because of the equity of the "good faith" belief. This bridge is absent in
a meretricious relationship and there are serious problems with constructing a bridge
of intestate rights for the meretricious spouse. See note 22 infra.
18. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3503 (West 1970) provides that a person is a dependent
if he is a good faith member of the workman's household. This "good faith" test
clearly applied to a putative spouse in Temescal Rock Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 180 Cal. 637, 182 P. 447 (1919), and would appear to cover a meretricious
spouse who was a "good faith" member of the workman's household. The primary
difference is that neither the putative spouse nor the meretricious spouse would be beneficiaries of the conclusive presumption that they were dependents; a status accorded
only to a legal spouse by CAL. LABOR CODE § 3501 (West 1970). See, e.g., Rossi
v. Standard Oil Co., 2 I.A.C. 339 (1915).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416 (1970). The putative spouse has been accorded recognition under the Social Security Act but again the bridge has been the intestate succession rights. See note 17 supra.
20. There is confusion yet as to whether a putative spouse has a right to a family allowance. See, Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 866 (1962). The difficulties in extending family allowance
and support rights to a putative spouse are present and magnified in the meretricious
relationship.
21. Shumaker v. Biscailuz, 130 Cal. App. 2d 414, 278 P.2d 939 (1955), and Rich
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An additional set of problems raised by the Cary decision concerns the priorities that will govern if one or both of the meretricious

parties is also legally married to a third person. Will the meretricious
couple's intervening "equitable common law marriage" produce property rights in derogation of the legal spouse? For instance, on the
death of one, what are the intestacy rights of the other as to the property accumulated during the
relationship and as to the separate prop22
erty of the deceased spouse?
This note will contrast the supportive reasoning of the Cary decision with the history and legislative intent of the Family Law Act of

1969 and with California's traditional judicial treatment of the meretricious spouse.

This analysis will demonstrate the weakness of the

fundamental rationales used by the Cary court to justify its decision.
In addition, the note will suggest alternatives that were available to the
court and that are available to attorneys confronted with similar situ-

ations. The Cary decision is an aberration that raises a myriad of
problems. The decision obfuscates California's marital law and distorts the community property system; it should not be relied upon or
followed.

In Re Cary
In July of 1962, Paul Cary and Janet Forbes began their relation-

ship. They met in the San Francisco Bay area; she was from Canada
and he was a Californian. Over the next eight years they produced
v. Ervin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 386, 194 P.2d 809 (1948), held invalid a declaration of
homestead by a meretricious spouse. The meretricious spouse's status, however, does
not affect the rights of the minor children of the relationship to a probate homestead.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 661 (West Supp. 1973).
22. Since the inception of the putative spouse doctrine in Coats v. Coats, 160
Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911), the courts in California have had to resolve on a case
by case basis the relative rights of the putative spouse vis-h-vis the legal spouse. This
litigation has been concerned with two main areas. First, the right to accumulated
property upon dissolution of the relationship. See, e.g., Turknette v. Turknette, 100
Cal. App. 2d 271, 223 P.2d 495 (1950); Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal. App. 98, 210
P. 143 (1921). Second, the right to accumulated property upon the death of one
spouse. See, e.g., Feig v. Bank of America, 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936); Sousa
v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970). A third area that has
not received definitive treatment is the right to the separate property of the deceased
spouse who dies intestate. See, e.g., Estate of Shank, 154 Cal. App. 2d 808, 316 P.2d
710 (1957); Garrado v. Collins, 136 Cal. App. 2d 323, 288 P.2d 620 (1955). This
last area is complicated if there are offspring of either marriage. The sine qua non
of the putative marriage is the equitable consideration of the putative spouse's good
faith belief in the legality of the marriage. It is this equitable consideration that has
enabled the courts to weigh the competing legal interests of the legal spouse and resolve the complex issues. The equitable consideration of good faith was missing in
Cary, yet the Cary court did not offer a similar basis for weighing the competing interests between the meretricious and legal spouse.
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four children who were supported by Paul and acknowledged to be
his own. The children's birth certificates and school registrations recorded their parents as Paul and Janet Cary. The couple represented
themselves to their parents and friends as husband and wife; Janet always used the name Cary. The couple filed joint income tax returns,
obtained credit, borrowed money, and secured a loan for the purchase
of a house that was purchased by a deed in the name of Paul Cary and
Janet Cary, his wife, as joint tenants.2 3
Both parties sought marriage at a time when the other was unreceptive to such a proposal. Paul testified that he had asked Janet
to marry him early in their relationship but that Janet refused.24
Janet testified that when she was pregnant with
their fourth child she
25
requested a marriage but was rebuffed by Paul.
Janet returned to Canada on two occasions and remained for as
long as three months. Finally, in October of 1970, Janet left and,
using $1000 that Paul had given to her, returned to Canada to stay.
The couple divided the household and personal goods. Janet took the
two youngest children; Paul kept the two older children. Shortly
thereafter, Paul went to Canada, took the two youngest children, and
returned to the United States. It was the dispute over the custody of
the children that led Paul to petition the Superior Court for a "nullity
of the marriage pursuant to California Civil Code §4001.,,26
The Superior Court found: no legal marriage had been entered
into; the children were the legitimate children of Paul and Janet; Paul
and Janet were to share joint legal custody of the four children and
ordered the two older children to remain with Paul and the two younger
children to return to Janet; Paul was to provide $90 per month for
each of the two younger children; and finally, the property acquired
27
by the parties was "quasi-community property."
23. Brief for Appellant at 3, In Re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1973).
24. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 9; Brief for Appellant at 3, In re Cary,
34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).

25.

Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 120; Brief for Appellant at 7, In Re Cary,

34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
26. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
27. CAL. Crv. CoDE. § 4803 (West 1970) defines quasi-community property as "all

real or personal property, wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired in any
of the following ways: (a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would
have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domi-

ciled in this state at the time of its acquisition. (b) In exchange for real or personal
property, wherever situated, which would have been community property if the spouse
who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at the time
of its acquisition." In light of section 4803, the trial court's use of the term "quasicommunity property" to refer to the Cary property would appear to be misplaced.
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On the basis of its finding "quasi-community prolierty", the Superior Court attempted to divide the property equally but "inadvertently ordered Paul to deliver to Janet his promissory note or cash in
the amount of $3000 instead of $150. ' 2 s (The error was conceded
by the parties.) In its equal division, the court awarded a $400 Falcon
to Janet and ordered Paul to provide the promissory note for a total
of $1900. Paul received the $3200 equity in the couple's home and
the $2000 in Paul's business but was ordered to pay the couple's outstanding $1800 loan ($1000 of which had gone to Janet when she left
for Canada).
Paul appealed and challenged the property division and the custody findings of the court. Judge Elkington, writing for Court of
Appeals of the First District summarily dismissed Paul's contention
that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding custody of the
two younger children to Janet. The Court of Appeals focused its attention on developing a foundation of support for applying California's community property system to a meretricious couple. The court
held that Paul and Janet's cohabitation constituted a "family" relationship.29 Having found a "family" relationship, the court decided that
the Family Law Act30 was intended to control the distribution of the
"family's" property. While the court recognized that California's
community property law "ordinarily appl[lied] only to those legally
wed,"'" the court noted that the community property principles had
"frequently been applied where one or both of the parties mistakenly,
but in good faith, believed themselves married.32 The court then noted
that historically California had denied relief to meretricious spouses
since "'equitable considerations' were not present . . . because of the
'guilt' of both of the parties."33
Undaunted by this precedent, however, the court found that
"'the basic substantive change in the law [brought about by the
Family Law Act] is the elimination of fault or guilt as grounds for
granting or denying divorce and for refusing alimony and making unequal division of community property. . . . ''
Thus, the court
concluded that the "guilt" of Paul and Janet's knowing failure to obtain a legal marriage had been rendered irrelevant by the Family Law
Act and the court was free to make an equal division of the property.
28.

34 Cal. App. 3d at 354, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.

29. Id. at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).
31. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
32. Id. at 349, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (citations omitted).
33.

Id.

34. Id. at 350, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865, quoting In Re McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673,
678, 493 P.2d 868, 871, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142 (1972).
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Any other result, the court continued, would "infer an inconsistent
legislative intent [for] the legislature has announced it to be the public policy of the state that concepts of 'guilt' . . . and 'innocence'...
are no longer relevant
whether there be a legal marriage or not,
and if not, regardless of whether the deficiency is known to one, or
both, or neither of the parties."3 5 Judge Elkington implemented his
logic by applying community property law in dividing Paul and Janet's
property; it was the first time that the one hundred and twenty five
year old system 36 had been applied to a meretricious relationship.
Legislative History of the Family Law Act
An analysis of events preceding the enactment of the Family Law
Act3 7 and of the legislative intent behind the enactment will demonstrate that there is no support for the court's application of the act to
Janet and Paul's meretricious relationship.
California's basic divorce law was enacted in 1872.8 Under this
prevailing system of divorce prior to 1969, the granting of a decree of
divorce depended upon proof to the satisfaction of the court that one
spouse was at fault in the marriage. A noted Judge observed:
When may a divorce be granted? Only when one party is guilty.
That is the only criterion fixed by the law in every state [in
1950]. Guilt is made the cause of divorce. What form of guilt
is specified by the "grounds", the overt acts or omissions which
39
the law says shall be sufficient cause-things we used to call sin.
Divorce was an adversary process that added to the already extant divisiveness. The procedure of requiring a finding of "guilt" before a
divorce could be granted was widely criticized and the debilitating process created a developing public opinion for reform.4 0 It was this divorce procedure which was reformed by the 1969 legislature.
"1963 appears to be the first year of major emphasis upon the
revision of divorce procedures in California."'" In that year, former
35.
36.

Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
California derived its community property system from the Spanish-Mexican

law in force at the time of California's acquisition by the United States. The first
express recognition of the system appears in CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. XI, § 14.
37. For a complete historical review of events and legislation concerning the
Family Law Act see KROM, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis,
1 PAC. L.J. 156 (1970) [hereinafter cited KRoM].

38.

Id. at 156.

39. Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36 A.B.A.J. 105, 107 (1950) (footnote omitted).
40. See M. FREEMAN, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW ACT PRACTICE § 5.7,
at 251 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar, 2d ed. 1972). See also ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM.,

1969 DIVORCE
(1969) [hereinafter cited as

REPORT OF

41.

REFORM LEGISLATION, 4 J. OF THE CALIF. ASSEMBLY
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT].

KROM, supra note 37, at 158.

8053

April 19741

IN RE CARY

Senator Pierce Young formed a legislative committee to develop a
program to strengthen family relations. 2 The committee's work led
to the Governor's Commission of the Family 43 in 1966 and Governor
Edmund G. Brown charged the committee to study "the high incidence
of divorce in our society and its often tragic consequences." 44 The
commission made an extensive proposal for legislation and suggested
family courts, the elimination of fault in divorce proceedings and the
revision of community property distribution. The commission's suggestions were embodied in bill form in 1967, 4 5 but the family court and
counselling provisions remained embroiled in controversy until a compromise manifested itself in the Family Law Act of 1969. Thus, "the
history of the development of the Act is replete with the legislators'
underlying intent not only to erase the anachronisms from California
divorce law, but to remove once and for all from the divorce action
the tragi-comedy of the adversary proceeding. '48
The Assembly Judiciary Committee Report of 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation (the Family Law Act) explains the provisions 47 and
purpose of the Act:
Since the whole statutory scheme [the existing divorce law]
was unrealistic, a procedure evolved which promoted hate, scorn,
bitterness and acrimony.
It is not at all surprising that. . . sham procedures developed. It was a natural reaction to the fact that proof of fault in
a divorce proceeding is undesirable and unrealistic.
First in priority, then, in any divorce reform was the elimination of the artificial fault standard. That is the premise of the
Family Law Act. The intent has been to devise practicable procedures and a basis for dissolution which 48
is descriptive of the actual reasons underlying marital breakdown.
There is no marital breakdown, however, in a meretricious relation42.

H.R. 234, 2 J. oF aH CALIF. ASSEMBLY 2276 (1963).

43.

THE REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOvERNoR's COMMISSION OF THE FAMILY

(1966).
44.

Gov. Edmund Brown, Charge to the Commission, May 11, 1966, quoted in

Tan REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION OF THE FAMILY 5 (1966).
45. A.B. 1420 (1967) and S.B. 826 (1967) contained the provisions for the fam-

ily court.
46. KROM, supra note 37, at 181.
47. The ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY CoMurrEE REPORT, supra note 39, discusses the
history of the legislation, the rationale for the elimination of the Family Court and
counselling suggestions of the Governor's Commission, the grounds and procedures for
divorce under the act, the provisions for divorce under the act, the provisions for void
and voidable marriage, the provisions for custody of children, the provisions concerning
the rights of the parties, and the date of the application of the act.
48. Id. at 8057 (emphasis added).
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ship. A breakdown in the relationship is possible but certainly not a
marital one within the terms and premises of the Family Law Act.
The Civil Code defines marriage as a personal relation arising out of
a civil contract.4 9 It is the manner of terminating the civil contract
that provided the impetus for the Family Law Act reforms; there is no
basis for applying the community property provisions of the act to a
relationship that did not have a civil contract to terminate. The trial
court in Cary found that no legal marriage had been entered into and
could not find a provision in the act to authorize a dissolution of the
Cary relationship; none exists. The Family Law Act does not, nor
was it intended to cover an unmarried cohabitation arrangement that
possesses some of the elements of a marriage but never constitutes a
legal marriage arising out of a civil contract.
Specific Manifestation of Legislative Intent to Retain "Good Faith"
"Innocence" Distinctions
The Family Law Act applies to lawful marriages." Where there
is a valid marriage, concepts of fault or guilt are not to be utilized in
dissolving the marriage, 5 in dividing the community property,52 or in
making alimony or support awards. 3 With limited exceptions evidence of specific acts of misconduct is to be excluded.5 4 However,
the legislature did not intend that "good faith" be eliminated in determining whether a relationship is subject to the provisions of the
Family Law Act. On the contrary, the Civil Code explicitly retain
"good faith" requirements.
Section 4452 is concerned with the adjudication of the status of
a putative spouse and the division of property acquired during the putative union. 5 The section states that such property will be known as
49.
50.

CAL. CIv. CODE § 4100 (West 1970).

See text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.

51. See In Re McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 678, 493 P.2d 868, 871, 100 Cal. Rptr.
140, 143 (1972); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1974) provides: "Except upon the
written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court,

the court shall, either in its interlocutory judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in
its judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it ex-

pressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the community
property and the quasi-community property of the parties, including any such property

from which a homestead has been selected, equally."
CAL.

CIV.

CODE

Compare § 4800(a) with former

§ 146 (West 1954) (repealed Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 3 at 3313).

Section 146 embodied the fault considerations that led to an unequal division of the
community property.
53. See id. § 4801 (West Supp. 1974).
54. Id. § 4509 (West 1970). Specific acts of misconduct may be introduced into
evidence when necessary to establish irreconciliable differences or when child custody
is being litigated.

55.

Id. § 4452 (West Supp. 1974).

A putative marriage is commonly defined
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"quasi-marital property."

Section 4455 is concerned with the right of

a putative spouse to receive support payments in the same manner as
if the marriage had not been void or voidable, "provided that the party

for whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative spouse." 58
If the legislature had intended to eliminate all considerations of "good
faith", as the Cary court contends, there clearly would have been no
need for enacting sections 4452 and 4455, for the property and sup-

port provisions of a putative marriage would then have fallen automatically under Civil Code sections 4800 and 4516.

The legislature recognized the distinction between lawful marriages and putative marriages; it explicitly retained "good faith" and
"innocence" as criteria for bringing a putative marriage within the

California marital and community property provisions. The Assembly
Committee's report clearly stated the legislative intent:
The new legislation provides for actions for a judgment of
nullity based upon void or voidable marriage. The sections pertaining to void marriage are largely declaratory of existing 5law
and are not intended to work significant substantive changes. 7

The report expresses the same intent for voidable marriages.

Thus,

where no "good faith" belief that the marriage was lawful exists, the

relationship does not come within the Family Law Act.

Since there

was no "good faith" belief in the legality of the Cary relationship, the

court should not have applied the community property principles of
the act to it.
Rules of Statutory Construction

Paul urged that since neither he nor Janet had a "good faith" belief, their relationship did not come within the act and the court should
as a solemnized marriage in which one or both parties are unaware of an impediment
that causes the marriage to be void or voidable. Estate of Foy, 109 Cal. App. 2d
329, 240 P.2d 685 (1952); W. DE FUNtAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMuNrrY
PROPERTY 96 (2d ed. 1971). While most states require a ceremony before there can
be a putative marriage, a few decisions have held that it is not necessary. Succession
of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935), noted in 10 TuL. L. REv. 435 (1936).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4206 (West 1970) provides: "No particular form for the ceremony
of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." Id. § 4452
(West Supp. 1974) provides in part: "Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed
in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties
to have the status of a putative spouse. . . ." Many states have not adopted the concept of a putative marriage. H. CLARK, Tim LAw oF DoMEsTc RELATMONS 52-54
(1968); 20 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.91, 94 (1963); 2 WiLLA ETrE L. 207 (1962).
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1974).
57. ASSEMBLY JUDICrARY Comim-rEn REPORT, supra note 40 at 8060 (emphasis
added).
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follow the rules set out in Keene v. Keene5 8 and Vallera v. Vallera.59
The court disagreed. The court found that Paul's argument would
lead to an "unreasonable result '" because a deceitful person who led
another to believe their marriage was valid would receive equal community property treatment under section 4452, while two candid persons who skipped the legal prerequisites of section 4100 would be
denied equal community property treatment. 61 Having found an "unreasonableness", the court cited statutory construction rules to authorize it to infer a legislative intent to extend the marital and property
laws to meretricious couples. The rule cited allowed the court to construe "the general tenor and scope of the entire scheme embodied in the
enactments" 62 and not the exact phraseology in which the intent has
been expressed. 63 An analysis of the goals of the equitable community
property system, however, reveals that the result is not "unreasonable"
and an analysis of California case law reveals a more restrained judicial attitude toward statutory construction than that exhibited by the
Cary court.
In light of the goals of the equitable community property system,
it is not "unreasonable" for the legislature and the courts to protect a
"good faith" belief in the legality of the marriage and not statutorily
provide for a couple who candidly avoided a legal marriage. The common law did not include the good faith putative spouse in its marital
system, but it provided protection by application of the principles of
contract, torts, quasi-contracts and restitution.6 4 California has used
these same methods65 and it has provided added protection under a
judicially created "equitable community property system."6
This
equitable community property system was partially codified in the
Family Law Act. 67 The courts, in applying this equitable community
58. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
59. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
60. 34 Cal. App.3d at 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865 (1973).
61. A meretricious couple would not be without judicial aid in asserting property
rights to property acquired during their relationship. See text accompanying notes 10619 infra. The distinction of the meretricious relationship is simply that there is no
good faith belief in the legality of the marriage; therefore, the community property
principles do not apply.
62. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
63. Id.
64. Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-MaritalRelations, 9 CORN. L.Q.
246 (1924), cited in H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY
63 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as VERRALL].
65. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
66. VERRALL, supra note 64, at 63-64. See also Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal.
335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911).
67. The Family Law Act was a revision of former Civil Code Sections 55 to
182. The act made modifications, enacted new sections and repealed others. However,
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property system, "have stressed the equitable character of the doctrine
and have cautioned that it cannot be 'applied where special circumstances make it inequitable, for instance where its application would
deprive third persons of vested rights. 6 8
Since the essence of the putative status is a good faith belief in
the legality of the marriage, the equitable community property system
applies. By necessity, the protection of the good faith spouse now requires equal community property treatment, under the equal division
dictates of Civil Code sections 4452 and 4800, for the deceitful
meretricious partner, if there be one. To give protection to good faith
belief does not require inferring an intent to extend California's marital
and property laws to a couple who "candidly" chose to ignore the law.
The Cary court's findings of unreasonableness is grounded in the contrast between "deceit" and "candor". Yet, neither the legislature nor
the courts have been concerned with deceit or candor. The legality of
the marriage is the starting point. In the absence of a bona fide marriage, the focus is on the good faith belief in the legality of the marriage. Thus, there is no "unreasonableness" or inconsistency in protecting the good faith belief and not "candor".
The cases relied upon by the Cary court to authorize it to look
beyond "exact phraseology" to "the general tenor and scope" of the
Family Law Act were concerned with the interpretation of specific
statutory words or phrases that were subject to two different constructions.6 9 For example, the origin of the rule, Palache v. Pacific
Insurance Co.,70 was concerned with the construction of the act creating the office of the Insurance Commissioner and the issue was whether
the phrases "in such cases" and "he shall" limited the discretion of the
commissioner. Similarly, the cases that followed the practical approach
of Palache were concerned with the construction of specific words or
phrases in a particular statute.7 1 The Cary court, on the other hand,
the act dealt only with marriage and dissolution. Therefore, only the equitable community property system principles that were related to marriage and dissolution were
affected. The act did not affect the community property principles that relate to death
and succession. Thus, the "equitable community property system" developed by the
courts to cover putative relationships has only been partially codified in so far as it
relates to marriage and dissolution. See VERRALL, supra note 64, at 64.
68. Id. at 65; see Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911).
69. The Cary court cited Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 122 P.2d 526
(1942) and Richie v. Tate Motors, Inc., 22 Cal. App. 3d 238, 99 Cal. Rptr. 223
(1971).
70. 42 Cal. 418 (1871).
71. Richie v. Tate Motors, Inc., 22 Cal. App. 3d 238, 99 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1971);
Benor v. Board of Medical Examiners, 8 Cal. App. 3d 542, 87 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1970);
In Re Morgan, 244 Cal. App. 2d 903, 53 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1966); Reed v. Hammond,
18 Cal. App. 442, 123 P. 346 (1912); In Re Sing, 14 Cal. App. 512, 112 P. 582
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was not concerned with specific statutory language. Indeed, the difficulty facing the Cary court was that it did not have any statutory
language to read from or any to support its eventual reading. The
court, however, by resorting to the Palache rule, presumed to overcome its earlier finding of "unreasonableness" and to construe the
Family Law Act as authorizing equal community property treatment
for a meretricious couple. This interpretation attributed to the legislature an intent the legislature never contemplated.
Furthermore, an analysis of the two principal cases construing
statutory changes in the community property system, Stewart v. Stewart72 and Grolemund v. Cafferata,73 reveal that "amendments to the
community property system while being given full effect, will not be
held to change other general doctrines of the system. .. .
Stewart was an appeal by a husband/defendant from a judgment for his wife/plaintiff quieting title to an undivided one-half
valid present interest in the couple's community property. The respondent/wife claimed she had the right to sue to quiet title to community property because of amendments to Civil Code sections 172,
172a 75 which gave the wife certain rights in the management and control of the community property. The Stewart court disagreed with the
wife and reversed:
The legislature in framing these two amendments . . . did not
state therein "in plain language" . . . "that the purpose of these
amendments was to vest in the wife during the
76 marriage a present
interest or estate in the community property."
Had the legislature seen fit to so declare in the language employed by it in the coincident statute, no doubt could have existed
as to its intent to work such a radical change in the former and
long-established status as to render the interest of the wife . . .
a present vested77estate . . . . The legislature did not do this nor
anything like it.
Having made and persisted in its own interpretation of these originals through all these years and having by so doing created and
consistently adhered to such interpretation as to render the same
(1910). But see California Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 128
Cal. App. 2d 797, 276 P.2d 148 (1954).
72. 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926).
73. 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).

74.

VERRALL,

supra note 64, at 22.

75. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 172, 172(a) were recodified in §§ 5125, 5127 (West
1970) with the enactment of the Family Law Act. Sections 5125 and 5127 were recently amended, Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 987, § 514-15 at 1682-83, to give the woman an
equal voice in the management and control of the community personal property and
community real property.
76. 199 Cal. 318, 339, 249 P. 197, 206 (1926).
77. Id. at 340, 249 P. at 206.
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a fully established rule of property it is78 for the legislature, but
not for this court, to depart from such rule.
The strict construction attitude of the Stewart court with regard
to the community property system manifested itself again in Grolemund
v. Cafferata.9 Mrs. Grolemund sought to enjoin the sale of community property for the satisfaction of a judgment against her husband,
Caesaer Grolemund. The issue was whether the enactment of Civil
Code section 161a, giving the wife a present, existing and equal interest in the community property, changed the rule that the community
property was subject to the husband's debts. The court answered no
and affirmed the trial court's refusal to enjoin execution.
The strict construction approach found in Stewart and Grolemund
has been followed in other cases. 80 These cases demonstrate the California courts' unwavering refusal to expand amendments to the community property system beyond their expressed content. Despite this
fact, the Cary court concluded that it was its "duty to give expression
to the public policy expressed by the Family Law Act" ' and held
"the Act supersedes contrary pre-1970 judicial authority." 82 In doing
so, the court trespassed on another axiom of California community
property law; the refusal to apply the system to meretricious relationships.
The Meretricious Rule
A meretricious spouse is "[o]ne who cohabits with another,
knowing that the relationship does not constitute a valid marriage
. Either spouse, or both, may be meretricious." 83 Flanagan v.
...
Capital National Bank"4 was the first California case to find a meretricious relationship by applying the good faith test enunciated in
Coats v. Coats.85 The court refused to treat a petitioning woman as
the putative spouse of the deceased man because she did not have a
good faith belief that her living arrangement constituted a valid marriage.
Vallera v. Vallera 0 and Keene v. Keene s are the best recent
78. Id. at 341, 249 P. at 207.
79. 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
80. See, e.g., Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 140 P.2d 386 (1943); McClain
v. Tufts, 83 Cal. App. 2d 140, 187 P.2d 818 (1947).
81. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
82. Id.
83. Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50
CALw. L. REV. 866, 873 (1962).
84. 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931).
85. 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911).
86. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
87. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
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expressions of the meretricious spouse rule. Vallera was an action for
separate maintenance and division of community property brought by
a disgruntled woman. Plaintiff knew from the beginning of the relationship that the defendant was married but she cohabited with the defendant anyway. Four years after the beginning of the relationship,
defendant, after an intervening divorce from his first wife, married yet
another woman. The trial court concluded that plaintiff and defendant had never been husband and wife; that plaintiff was not entitled
to maintenance; and that there was no community property. It held,
however, that the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the property acquired during the two and one-half year period defendant was not legally
married by virtue of a tenancy in common. The supreme court reversed:
The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman
living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she
is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone
the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during
the period of their relationship. It has already been answered in
the negative. Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the sta'tus of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such
a case.88
Keene v. Keene represents the most recent reiteration of the meretricious rule. It was an action for divorce that sought to comply with
the remedies"" suggested in Vallera and to impress a trust on the proceeds of an alleged joint venture or partnership. The trial court found
that the cohabitation of the parties was at all times based solely upon
a meretricious relationship, denied relief, and gave judgment for the
defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed. The court expressly "adhere[d] to the Vallera rule,"9 cited the intervening District Court
88. 21 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Justice Curtis dissented: "I disagree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that in order to sustain the judgment of the tilal court there must be proof of
a definite monetary contribution by the plaintiff in the form of separate property, or
a contribution of her earnings as a waitress or from other employment outside the
home. In the absence of any proof of any cash or property contribution by the plaintiff, the holding of the trial court that she owned a one-half interest in the property
accumulated must have been based upon the conclusion that the value of her services
as a housekeeper, cook, and homemaker was of sufficient value to warrant an equal

division of the property." Id. at 686, 134 P.2d at 763 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added).
89. In dictum, the Vallera court stated that plaintiff's status "would not . . . preclude her from recovering property to which she would otherwise be entitled. 21 Cal.
2d at 685, 134 P.2d at 763. The court then suggested the remedies: An express agreement, and in the absence of an agreement protection through trust remedies for the
proportion that her funds contributed toward the acquisition of the property. Id. See
text accompanying notes 110-19 infra.
90. 57 Cal. 2d at 662, 371 P.2d at 331, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
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of Appeals decisions 91 and sister-state decisions92 and noted that dis-

crimination is not always visited upon the woman.93 The court refused

to impress a trust on the basis that the plaintiff's services, both marital
and those rendered in the running and operation of a ranch, could

not constitute consideration for an interest in defendant's property upon
which a resulting trust could be declared.94
As the above discussion indicates, the courts have refused to ex-

tend the community property system to a meretricious relationship because:
1. Society has a "well-settled interest" in lawful. marriages that requires protection; therefore, the benefits and protections of the com-

munity property system apply only to lawfully contracted marriages;
2.

Where there has been a good faith belief that there was a law-

ful marriage but the marriage was void or voidable, then the courts
91. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948); Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal.
App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
92. Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Wellmaker v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958); Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966, 93 So.
2d 232 (1957); Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12 (1949).
93. Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464 (1913); McQuin v. Rice, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1948); Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d
39 (1948); cf. Orth v. Wood, 354 Pa. 121, 47 A.2d 140 (1946); Wosche v. Kraning,
353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220 (1946); Beuck v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744
(1946).
94. Plaintiff in Keene was suing for an interest in the property standing in defendant's name based on her contribution of extra-marital services. Keene rejected the
extra-marital services as a basis of an interest on the grounds that services were not
funds. 57 Cal. 2d at 663-64, 371 P.2d at 332, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596. Furthermore,
the court rejected either a theory of contract implied in fact or a theory of quasi-contract or contract implied in law on the basis that no evidence was in the record of
compliance with the specific requirements of either theory. Id. at 664, 371 P.2d at
333, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
The court noted, however, that plaintiff was not seeking to recover the reasonable
value of the extra-marital services rendered and consequently did not decide that issue.
Id. It appears that upon proper proof the recovery could be made, although, the recovery would probably be less than the establishment of an interest in property.
Justice Peters dissented, not to the continuation of the treatment of meretricious
couples, but to the low opinion the court held for "extra-marital services". Justice
Peters felt that services in excess of normal marital services should be equal to funds.
Id. at 672, 371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 602. There was evidence in Keene that
the woman helped run the ranch and raise sheep and other livestock. Justice Peters
reasoned that if there had been no cohabitation the court would have found a business
relationship and implied a contract. "Illicit cohabitation does not invalidate an otherwise valid relationship. The man is not entitled to benefit from such non-wifely services simply because the two have illegally cohabited." Id. For an analysis of Justice
Peters' dissent see Comment, The Impact of Vallera and Keene Cases on the Rights
of the MeretriciousSpouse, 6 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 354, 364-65 (1973).
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find equitable considerations present and apply an "equitable community property system" where it would be equitable to do so;
3. "Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage
entered into in good faith are not present in [a meretricious relationship]" 9 5 and the community property system is withheld.
Withholding the application of the community property system, however, does not mean that a meretricious couple is without judicial remedy in the assertion of rights to property acquired by them during their
relationshipf 6 The status of their relationship is no bar to judicial aid
in asserting valid property rights.
Alternative Remedies Available in Cary
A review of the property in Cary and the manner of division by
the court is necessary to provide a framework for the following discussion of the available alternatives of disposition. Paul and Janet
possessed the following property9 7 at the time of their separation: (1)
$400 car. (2) $3200 equity in a home held by Paul and Janet Cary,
his wife, as joint tenants. (3) $2000 in Paul's business. (4) $1800
liability on a loan taken out when Janet left for Canada ($1000 going
to Janet and $800 going to Paul).
The trial court intended to divide the property evenly. Janet received the $400 car. Paul received the $3200 equity in the home and the
$2000 in his business. To balance the difference, the court ordered
Paul to provide Janet with a $1500 promissory note or cash (the court
originally inadvertently ordered a $3000 note but both parties conceded the error and it was rectified by the appellate court) and ordered
Paul to be liable for the couple's $1800 loan. Under the trial court's
decision and the appellate court's affirmance, Janet received $1900
(or $2900 if the $1000 share of the borrowed loan is included) and
Paul received $1900 (or $2700 if the $800 share of the loan is included).
The same or a similiar result could have been reached without
applying community property principles to the division. First, the
trial court could have found that the parties themselves had disposed of
95. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684-85, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1943).
96. Withholding the application of the community property system was a legislative policy decision intended to encourage solemnized marriages. This policy decision
has been strictly adhered to by the courts. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.

The adherence to the withholding, however, has not affected general remedies available
to any two parties in a dispute over property. Unlike the party in a legal or putative
marriage, the meretricious spouse does not acquire rights in property by virtue of the

relationship alone.
97. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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their property except for their joint tenancy interests in the home.
When Janet left for Canada, the parties divided the household and
personal property; Janet received the car and was ultimately given
$1000 of the $1800 loan. At this point, only the interest in the home
remained. The home was owned in joint tenancy. In a similar situation, with an identical deed, the court in Weak v. Weak98 held that
"[tlhe fact that a deed is taken in joint tenancy establishes a prima
facie case that the property is actually owned in joint tenancy." 99 In
Weak, a meretricious wife brought an action to establish her right to a
half interest in real property. The trial court gave judgment for the
defendant putative husband but the appellate court reversed stating
that the law does not deprive a meretricious woman of property jointly
acquired with her companion. Furthermore, in Cary there was evidence that Paul had offered full ownership of the equity in the house
to Janet. Thus, the trial court could have found that the house was
owned jointly and given Janet a one-half interest in the couple's house.
This result would have provided Janet with $1600, or $100 more than
she ultimately received through the $1500 promissory note.
Secondly, a meretricious spouse is entitled to share in the accumulated property, if there is an express agreement to that effect.100 An
enforceable agreement can exist to pool their earnings, 0 1 share in the
accumulations,1.0 2 or to compensate for services. 03 Since Janet did
not earn income outside the home, the pooled earnings agreement is
not applicable. In addition, since the parties did not directly present
evidence on this point, it is difficult to conjecture whether or not the
trial court could have found an agreement. Paul maintained that there
was no agreement but he conceded that the parties made a division of
the property when Janet left for Canada. Also, there was evidence
that he offered her the $3200 equity in the home; an indication that
she should share in the accumulations. Finally, Janet may have made
contributions to Paul's business; these contributions could have provided sufficient consideration for an agreement to compensate for serv98. 202 Cal. App. 2d 632, 21 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1962).
99. Id., at 638, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
100. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 662, 371 P.2d 329, 332, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
596 (1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684-85, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943);
Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954).
101. E.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
102. E.g., Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2d 632, 21 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1962).
103. Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951) discusses an
agreement for the compensation of services rendered while living together, but it appears from a reading of other cases, particularly Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681,
134 P.2d 761 (1943), and Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d
727 (1950), that the services contemplated must be something of value other than the
illicit cohabitation.
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ices. A subtle distinction should be drawn in defining contributions.
Where contributions are the consideration for an agreement, then they
could include any type of "contribution" that is not related to or based
on the illicit cohabitation. Thus, contributions need not be funds and
could be extra-marital services. "In the absence of an agreement as
to the amount of compensation, the court will determine the reasonable
value of the services .
,104 It would not have been unreasonable
"...
to have awarded Janet a half interest in the couple's assets based on
Janet's contributions to Paul's business. Thus, the trial court, if evidence had been presented, could have made a division on the basis of
an agreement to share in the accumulations or to compensate for services.
Further Considerations for Establishing Property Rights in a
Meretricious Relationship
Other solutions are possible in fact situations which vary slightly
from those in the Cary case. First, under Civil Code section 4104
"[a]ll marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the same were contracted,
are valid in this state." 05 Therefore, California recognizes a common
law marriage if it is validly created in a state that allows common law
marriages. 10 6 Fifteen states and the District of Columbia recognize
common law marriages. 0 7 Thus, where a relationship appears at
first glance to be meretricious, the couples might actually have engaged
in a legal common law marriage; the couple then would be recognized
in California as legally married.
Secondly, even a good faith belief that a common law marriage
was valid is sufficient to make the believer a putative spouse. 108 Thus,
if Janet and Paul had believed in good faith that they had contracted
a valid common law marriage, even where none actually existed, then
it appears that they would have been subject to the "equitable community property system" developed by the California courts.
104.

Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50

L. REV. 866, 877 (1962).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (West 1970).

CALIF.

106. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d 276, 169 P.2d 633 (1946).
107. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 45-46
(1968) lists fourteen states and the District of Columbia that continue to recognize
common law marriages: Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina and Texas. A recent New Hampshire statute, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:
39 (1968), provides that a legal marriage will be declared after three years of cohabitation, acknowledgement and reputation as man and wife.
108. Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952).
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Third, a meretricious spouse can establish rights in the accumulated
property under the following circumstances: (1) A resulting trust
remedy is available to a meretricious spouse who has provided all or
part of the purchase price to acquire property placed in the name of
the other spouse. 109 The contribution must have been of funds or
other property of value11 0 and must have been contributed either before
or at the time of purchase. 1 The contributions of services and even
extra-marital services, such as work operating a ranch or business, has

been held not sufficient to merit the imposition of a resulting trust. 1 '
(2) A constructive trust remedy may be available if the meretricious
spouse was induced to transfer title to property held in his/her own
name to the other spouse. 1

3

(3)

Where the meretricious spouses have

made an express agreement to pool earnings, share in accumulations or
to compensate for services, it will be enforced." 4 Despite strong dissent,"

5

the decision in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich" 6 remains the best

example of the courts' reluctance to compensate for services in the absence of an agreement. 1

7

The courts, however, appear to be willing to

109. Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909), cited in Vallera
v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943).
110. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
111. E.g., Elliott v. Wood, 95 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 212 P.2d 906, 908 (1949);
McGuin v. Rice, 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 917-18, 199 P.2d 742, 744 (1948).
112. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 665, 371 P.2d 329, 334, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
598-99 (1962).
113. A constructive trust arises by operation of law and is imposed because the
person holding the title to property would profit by a wrong or would be unjustly enriched. Sampson v. Bruder, 47 Cal. App. 2d 431, 118 P.2d 28 (1941). A voluntary
conveyance without consideration furnishes no basis for a constructive trust, however,
exceptions can be found due to fraud, deceit, duress, undue influence, and mistake. See
49 CAL. JuR. 2d Trusts §§ 376-91 (1959). Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 665, 371
P.2d 329, 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 597 (1962), dismissed the possibility that the woman
could seek the imposition of a constructive trust for the value of services rendered;
Keene did not foreclose the constructive trust remedy where there was a transfer of
actual property.
114. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943); Bridges
v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954).
115. See dissent by Justice Peters in Keene, supra note 92, and dissent by Justice
Curtis in Vallera, supra note 85.
116. 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
117. In Lazzarevich, plaintiff and defendant were legally married. They began
a divorce action but decided to reconcile their differences and remain married. Unknown to either, however, a final decree of divorce was entered in the action. The
defendant/husband became aware of the final decree but he did not inform the plaintiff/wife and they continued to live together and the wife continued to render services.
Later, the wife became aware of the divorce decree. The court permitted recovery for
services for the period the plaintiff was unaware of the decree (the good faith putative
period) but denied recovery for the period after the awareness (the meretricious period).
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-take a liberal attitude toward finding such agreements, 118 though the
evidence offered to prove the agreement must show that the consideration
for the promise was something of value other than the illicit cohabitation. 119 (4) Finally, a meretricious spouse could draw inspiration from
the vigorous dissents of Justices Curtis and Peters and make a determined
argument that he or she should be compensated for services or extramarital services rendered during the relationship. The facts in Cary
furnished a strong foundation for this type of attack.
Conclusion
In re Cary extended California's community property system to a
meretricious relationship for the first time in the state's history. The
decision based this extension on the finding of a "family" and on an
interpretation of the Family Law Act, a 1969 revision of California's
divorce law. Cary presented strong factual circumstances and there
can be no argument with the appellate court's finding of a family.
That finding is the one aspect of the court's decision that will withstand scrutiny for in its attempt to cope with the emotive circumstances
of Cary, the court has obfuscated California's marital law, distorted
the community property system, misunderstood the intentions of the
legislature, misapplied the Family Law Act, nullified legislative policy
decisions, and raised a myriad of problems for California courts, attorneys and meretricious couples.
To support its analysis of the Family Law Act, the court cites:
It is for the legislature. . . to choose between conflicting policies, . . . " "The declaration of public policy is essentially a legislative function and although the courts occasionally invade the
",120
field, a declaration by the legislature is paramount ....
The Cary decision "invaded the field"; it nullified previous legislative
policy decisions; it distorted and ignored the act. The effect of the
118. Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951), and Bridges
v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954), were cases where the court

found an agreement primarily on the testimony of the meretricious spouse.
119.

Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950),

was a suit against an estate for services rendered to the decedent.

The trial court

found an agreement and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Though the appellate
court conceded that there was sufficient facts to find an agreement, it reversed the decision because of the trial court's failure to base its judgment exclusively on compensable
services. The court held that "[a]id will never be given by any court to a person

who bases his cause of action or claim upon illegal or immoral acts of conduct."

Id.

at 603, 213 P.2d at 730, citing Ballerino v. Ballerino, 147 Cal. 544, 545, 82 P. 199,
200 (1905). The plaintiff fatally included allegations of marital services as compensa-

ble services in her complaint.
120. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866, quoting Werner v. Southern
California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 129, 216 P.2d 825, 830 (1950) and

Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal. 2d 111, 115, 119 P.2d 340, 343 (1941) (emphasis omitted).
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Cary decision is to allow common law marriages; couples may now
establish their "family" outside the legal prerequisites of the Civil Code
and this action, where a dispute arises, will be held valid in the assertion of property rights. The legislature, however, has determined that
it is the public policy of California to encourage solemnized marriages.
It has defined marriage, specified the means of contracting a valid
marriage and specifically delineated the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a legal marriage. The community property system applies
to legal marriages. The legislature has specifically excluded common
law marriages by consent alone as a legal form of marriage. Adopting
the Cary form of retrospective marriage and extending the community
property system to a meretricious couple involves conflicting social
policies; it should be for the legislature to choose.
PatrickA. Nielson*

